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Abstract:  
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced significant institutional changes for European Union’s (EU’s) 
external relations administration, notably the establishment of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). Beside staff transferred from the Council Secretariat-General and the 
European Commission, the EEAS’ workforce is set to consist of approximately 33 per cent 
officials temporarily assigned from member-states by June 2013. This paper analyses to what 
extent and under what conditions the recruitment practice of member-state officials into 
EEAS is independent of government influence. The data draws on interviews with public 
officials from all 27 member-states as well as the EEAS charged with the selection of national 
public servants to the EEAS. Our findings suggest substantial independence in the 
recruitment of domestic government officials to the EEAS. We argue that this serves as a 
hard case of political order transformation since it happens in a policy field historically 
marked by national control and a lack of EU capacity. Independent recruitment of staff to 
the EEAS is facilitated under two conditions: (i) the supply of administrative capacities at EU 
level strengthen the EEAS’ capacity to nurture an independent recruitment of its personnel, 
and (ii) the recruitment of EEAS personnel is fashioned by pre-existing organisational 
traditions, practices and formats. 
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Introduction* 
Institutional innovations often attract significant attention from both policy-makers and 
researchers alike. The European External Action Service (EEAS) – formally established by 
Council decision in July 2010 and operational since January 2011 – is no exception. For 
example, Nivet (2011: 11) suggests that the EEAS is a “promising research project” that 
allows “to study, live, the creation, institutionalisation and socialising process of a new 
European institution”. However, much of the nascent EEAS literature exhibits a normative 
bias towards assessing merely how the new ‘service’ ought to be organised to make the 
European Union (EU) a coherent actor on the global stage (e.g. Bátora 2011; Carta 2011; 
Furness 2012; Nivet 2011). Some recent studies, however, offer ‘positive’ studies of the 
EEAS, for example by examining its initial formation (Murdoch 2012a) and exploring 
attitudes of its officials (Pomorska and Juncos 2012). Nonetheless, as an analytical 
laboratory, the EEAS remains under-utilised. In this article, we address this by providing an 
in-depth analysis of the recruitment of European Union (EU) member-state officials into the 
EEAS. The question posed is to what extent and under what conditions recruitment of 
domestic government officials to the EEAS is relatively independent of member-state 
influence. It is theoretically argued and empirically shown that independent recruitment of 
EEAS personnel is facilitated under two conditions: First, (i) the supply of administrative 
capacities at EU level are likely to strengthen the EEAS’ capacity to nurture an independent 
recruitment of its personnel. Secondly, (ii) the recruitment of EEAS personnel is likely to be 
fashioned by pre-existing organisational traditions, practices and formats. Independent 
recruitment of EEAS personnel is seen in this paper as a hard case of political order 
transformation (see below). 
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Member-state officials are set to make up 33 per cent of EEAS AD-level staff by mid-2013 
(Regulation No 1080/2010 of 24 November 2010 of the European Parliament and the 
(Union) Council)1. Although disregarded thus far in literature, the process of recruitment of 
EEAS staff is important for at least three reasons. First, assuming that the demographic 
profile of government officials shapes basic features of their decision-making behaviour (e.g. 
Meier and Nigro 1976), it is important to understand how the demographic profile of 
government institutions comes about. Analysing recruitment procedures utilised within 
these institutions provides one route towards this. Second, the theory of representative 
bureaucracy contends that officials’ discretion is (or should be) at least partly circumscribed 
by the interests of the respective societal groups from which bureaucrats originate (Wise 
2003). Finally, and most significantly for our purpose, analysing the recruitment process and 
procedures within the EEAS provides important information about the extent to which EEAS’ 
capacities in foreign relations remain at arm’s length from the Council and member-states’ 
influence. More pronounced independence of EEAS’ recruitment practices would thereby be 
indicative of order transformation in this policy domain (Trondal 2012). Order 
transformation necessitates that EEAS’ recruitment processes being fairly independent of 
government influence (Trondal and Peters 2013). Achieving such independence may, 
however, not be straightforward in the recruitment of staff to the EEAS since it happens in a 
policy field historically marked by national control and a lack of EU capacity.  
 
The empirical analysis draws on a new dataset consisting of 29 semi-structured interviews 
with coordinators of the temporary assignment of member-state officials to the EEAS 
collected between March 2011 and February 2012 . The interviews included coordinators 
from all 27 member-states as well as the EEAS, and were conducted during, and specifically 
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concentrated on, the first and second major hiring rounds (or ‘rotations’) for the EU 
delegations and EEAS Headquarters in Brussels that were open to member-state officials. 
These rotations were organised in a period of rapid institutional change, which is important 
for theoretical reasons since it allows us to analyse the recruitment of personnel during the 
formative stages of a new institution (see also below). The data suggest that the EEAS is an 
example of the transformation of Europe’s political order in which EU institutions acquire 
extensive independence from an inherent intergovernmental order in foreign policy. In fact, 
EEAS represents a hard case of such order transformation due to both the inherent 
intergovernmental stronghold of this policy area and the historical lack of EU capacity 
building within this policy field (Duke et al. 2012; Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013). We 
furthermore show that the independence of recruitment of EEAS personnel is predominantly 
facilitated under two conditions: First, (i) by the supply of administrative capacities at EU 
level, and secondly (ii) by pre-existing organisational traditions, practices and formats, 
notably within the Commission. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section outlines a theoretical departure in two 
steps. Step I outlined the dependent variable of the study (independent recruitment). Step II 
introduces two conditions for order transformation (administrative capacity and pre-existing 
organisational formats). The subsequent section briefly presents the data and methodology, 
followed by a presentation of key results from the study. The final section provides a 
concluding discussion. 
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A theoretical departure 
This section involves two steps. The first step addresses the question of how we can 
empirically observe order transformation in the domain of EU foreign policy administration. 
This step outlines the dependent variable of the study, i.e. the independence of recruitment 
of EEAS personnel. The second step proposes two independent variables that may account 
for conditions under which recruitment to the EEAS may become more or less insulated from 
government influence, and thus conditions under which order transformation may occur. 
  
Step I: Order transformation through independent recruitment of staff 
A vast literature on state building has demonstrated how the formation of new political 
orders tends to involve delicate balancing acts between creating action capacities for the 
standardisation and penetration of the territory and concerns for local autonomy (Rokkan 
1999). More recently, studies have suggested that the rise of common institutions at 
international level may profoundly affect levels of political autonomy at government levels 
below: i.e., international bureaucracies profoundly influencing world politics (Biermann and 
Siebenhüner 2009), affecting power distributions across levels of government (Egeberg and 
Trondal 2009), and contributing to transform domestic democratic governance (Keohane et 
al. 2009).  
 
How can we then empirically observe order transformation (in a European context) when we 
come across it? A comprehensive conceptualisation of European order transformation 
includes (at least) four variables, of which this study focuses on the first: independence, 
integration, co-optation and institutionalisation (see Trondal and Peters 2013).  
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First, and key to this paper, order transformation necessitates the rise of independent 
administrative capacity at EU level. Envisaged already by Saint-Simon in 1814 (1964: 35-38), 
one necessary factor in building a common political order is the establishment of common 
institutions, including a permanent congress independent of national governments serving 
the common interest. More recently, order transformation through institutional capacity 
building is seen as one key ingredient of state formation (Bartolini 2005). In a European 
context, it entails the development of administrative capacities that supply the European 
Commission (Commission) with the capacity to act relatively independently from pre-existing 
executive orders at the national level. If one focuses on the integration of public 
administration in Europe, what matters is the extent to which a new European executive 
centre (here, the EEAS) in practice (e.g. regarding its recruitment of personnel) is 
autonomous from key components of an intergovernmental administrative order. 
 
Secondly, order transformation requires some degree of integration of government 
institutions. This entails both the integration of common administrative resources (for 
example the de facto integration of the Commission and the EEAS) as well as the internal 
integration of each institution (e.g. inside EEAS), thus reinforcing intra-institutional 
administrative hierarchies. Third, order transformation entails that this independent and 
integrated order is also able to co-opt administrative sub-centres by stealth. In a European 
context, this would entail that there is a process of integration of domestic government 
agencies and relevant EU administrative structures in the field of foreign policy. 
Furthermore, this might also imply that EU institutions co-opt other international 
bureaucracies, thus developing a common political order beyond the EU through the 
emergence of common global administrative architectures in the field of foreign policy. 
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Finally, order transformation would involve not only structural relationships among 
institutions but also the institutionalisation of shared values within EU-level institutions (e.g. 
the EEAS). Those common values may be important in defining common purpose and the 
social cement of a common order (Elster 1989).  
 
With reference to the first indicator of order transformation outlined above, independence 
can be assessed both when institutions are created and reformed, and during everyday 
decision-making processes. Analysing the recruitment of personnel during the formative 
stages of a new institution (i.e., EEAS) one important question is how independent the 
recruitment process is from the influence of member-state governments (Bátora 2011). Two 
proxies can thereby be applied to gauge degrees of independence of recruitment to EEAS:  
 
The actual recruitment practice of national officials to the EEAS may be measured by 
considering qualities of candidates. How much emphasis is put on recruitment by merit 
versus nationality of the candidates (i.e., geographical balance may signal some degree of 
national ‘ownership’ of the EEAS), on technical expertise versus diplomatic qualifications of 
candidates (the former was key to Commission’s hiring in external relations, while the latter 
reflect the legacy of member-state recruitment of diplomats), and on diplomatic work 
globally versus previous diplomatic work in the Brussels institutions of these candidates?  
 
First, independent recruitment of candidates to the EEAS would imply that emphasis is put 
on:  
- Recruitment by merit relatively more than nationality; 
- ’Technical’ expertise of candidates relatively more than their diplomatic expertise; 
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- Prior diplomatic experiences in Brussels  relatively more than prior diplomatic 
experiences globally. 
 
Secondly, independent recruitment to the EEAS is measured by the extent to which 
- A direct application system is installed at EU-level ensuring that applicants need not 
apply via an indirect application system in member-state governments; 
- The composition of (pre-)selection panels is dominated relatively more by 
Commission and/or EEAS staff than member-state representatives. 
 
Step II: Independent recruitment – under what conditions? 
Whether or not the EEAS is de facto subject to independent recruitment, the question then 
arises how we can theoretically account for conditions under which recruitment of EEAS 
personnel is likely to be relatively independent of government influence. This question is 
addressed using an organisational theory approach. In such theoretical framework, the 
behaviour of civil servants is argued to be considerably shaped by the organisational 
structures embedding them. Civil servants tend to experience overloads of potential and 
inconsistent information that may be attended to at decision situations. The relation 
between actors’ mental abilities and the complexity of problems are not always in sync 
(Bendor 2003: 435). The overload facing civil servants goes beyond the presence of too 
much data. It is often as much a question of actors’ ability to perceive and interpret available 
data as it is to compute data (Sutcliffe and Weick 2008: 62). Essentially, the organisational 
capacities embedding civil servants may guide their decision-making behaviour by providing 
a means to deal with their computational limitations and the need for selective search 
among the latter. In short, “organizational properties compensate for the cognitive 
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constraints of individual decision makers” (Bendor 2003: 450). Organisational capacity may 
thus regulate, constitute and construct the (recruitment) decision-making processes that 
emerge within political institutions, ultimately affecting the decisions being made. “Working 
rules of behavior inform the everyday boundaries of what governmental officials must do, 
what they can do, and what they can expect others to do” (Skowronek 1982: 24).  
 
Organisational theory may thus succeed in explaining decision-making processes and human 
behaviour by focusing on dimensions such as formal organisational structures, roles, 
routines and standard operating procedures, physical structures, demography and 
recruitment (Egeberg 2003). According to this line of argument, two propositions follow as 
regards recruitment of EEAS personnel:  
 
1) First, the supply of administrative capacities at EU level relative to those in the 
member-state governments would strengthen EEAS’ capacity to nurture an 
independent recruitment of its personnel. Studies suggest that the supply of 
independent organisational capacities inside the Commission in practice tends to 
safeguard its autonomy vis-à-vis member-state governments (Trondal 2012). 
Previous work on the establishment of the EEAS also demonstrates that intra-
institutional organisational capacities benefit inter-institutional negotiations: The 
relative strength of the Secretariat-General of the Commission strengthens its 
influence on the formation of the EEAS relative to other EU institutions (such as the 
Council) (Murdoch 2012a). Thus, the rise of independent administrative capacities for 
recruitment within the EEAS may contribute to independent recruitment practices of 
EEAS personnel.  
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The following proxies are used to gauge administrative capacity: (i) the degree to 
which exclusive organisational capacities are installed within the EEAS and/or the 
Commission for the recruitment of EEAS personnel; and (ii) the provision of relevant 
information by the EEAS and/or the Commission to new EEAS candidates during the 
recruitment process: The crucial question is if such information is offered by the EEAS 
equally to all member-state governments (shared information) or if member-states 
supply relevant information mainly to their own candidates nationally (local 
information).  
 
2) Secondly, an organisational approach suggests that recruitment practices are likely to 
be fashioned by pre-existing organisational traditions, practices and formats (Olsen 
2010: 96). Organisational theory ascribes an autonomous role for pre-existing 
organisational structures to account for the emergence and institutionalisation of 
new organisational structures, and their effects – even though the match between 
environments and new institutional structures is not automatic and precise (Olsen 
2010). The compound institutional terrain and the ‘genetic soup’ of pre-existing 
political institutions may serve as important sources of resilience and opportunity in 
the genesis of recruitment structures and practices (Olsen 2010; Pierson 2004: 47). 
Particularly in periods of rapid institutional formation – as faced by Europe at the 
time of the establishment of the EEAS – new institutional arrangements may be 
particularly fashioned by pre-existing organisational forms. Moreover, lack of time 
when creating new institutions makes decision-makers’ ‘pursuit of intelligence’ 
bounded and their search for solutions local (March 2010: 19). They may tend to 
12 
 
replicate what is commonly perceived as past successes. Learning from experience, 
however, is also associated with the sample size of past experiences (March 2010). In 
cases with a large sample size of past experiences, the likelihood of institutional 
reproduction may be fairly high. It can therefore be expected that member-states with 
strong organisational capacities, resources and traditions for recruitment of diplomats 
are likely to co-ordinate the recruitment of EEAS officials more strongly than member-
states with few domestic capacities and traditions for diplomatic recruitment. Similarly, 
the Commission’s tradition of calling upon policy experts rather than diplomats may 
become reflected in the recruitment of domestic diplomatic personnel to the EEAS. 
 
Data and methods 
The empirical analysis exploits information obtained from 29 semi-structured interviews 
with 31 respondents conducted, recorded and transcribed by the authors. These interviews 
(referred to as Interviews 1-29 below to maintain confidentiality) took place between March 
2011 and February 2012 either via telephone (19 interviews) or face-to-face (8 interviews), 
and lasted between 30 and 95 minutes. Due to time constraints, two interviewees only 
provided written answers to the questions in our interview guide. While anonymity was 
requested by all our respondents, non-response proved to be a minor concern (although we 
sometimes needed to repeatedly contact our targeted respondent for an appointment). To 
allow us to cross-validate the obtained information, respondents were not only asked to 
provide information about their own institution, but also about their opinions regarding the 
activities of other member-states and the EEAS’ Human Resources directorate.  
It is important to highlight that the interviews were conducted during, and mainly 
concentrated on, the hiring rounds for 31 (deputy) heads of delegations between January 
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and March 2010 and that for posts in EU delegations and EEAS Headquarters starting in the 
summer of 2010.2 Crucially, these were the first two hiring rounds in which member-state 
officials could apply for a position in the EEAS, which is decisive from a theoretical point of 
view since, as indicated above, it allows analysing the recruitment of personnel during the 
critical formative stages of a new institution.  
 
In terms of our respondent selection strategy, it is important to note that our interview list 
comprised of the officials responsible for EEAS recruitment in all 27 member-states’ foreign 
affairs departments, as well as members of the EEAS’ Human Resources directorate. In the 
latter case, we interviewed the Depute Head of Division in the HR directorate in the EEAS 
responsible for recruitment of temporary member-state officials. For member-states, 
interviewees were officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 25 out of 27 
countries (with positions ranging from Head of Unit to Director-General and diplomatic ranks 
from Counsellor to Ambassador), while for the remaining two countries they were employed 
in the country’s Permanent Representation in Brussels (both at the rank of Counsellor). 
Although all interviewees carried direct responsibility within their work portfolio for the 
member-state’s recruitment policy regarding the EEAS, substantial variation existed across 
respondents in terms of their a) official institutional affiliation, b) length of affiliation to the 
MFA, and c) personal experience within the EU administration in Brussels. Specifically, nine 
respondents were affiliated to the MFA’s Department of Human Resources, eleven to 
departments dedicated to EU Affairs, four to the cabinet of the country’s Foreign Minister, 
and the remaining six respondents to the MFA’s Secretariat-General. While respondents’ 
length of affiliation to the MFA ranged from 5 to 32 years, 16 had worked for the MFA for 15 
years or more (note that our EEAS respondent had 18 years of experience in the EU 
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institutions). Finally, half of the member-state respondents (15 out of 30) had direct 
personal work experience in the EU institutions in Brussels (most often in the country’s 
Permanent Representation), while eight worked in their ministry’s directorate for European 
affairs and six had no direct experience with the Brussels institutions (one respondent failed 
to clarify his/her EU experience). We return to this variation in all three dimensions below, 
as this can be interpreted as a set of indicators for the importance attached by a member-
state to the recruitment process for the EEAS. 
 
Results 
The main objective of the EEAS has been, in a nutshell, to foster both vertical and well as 
horizontal foreign policy coherence between the EU and its member-states as well as within 
and between the different EU policies that has an ‘external dimension’ (Duke 2012; Gebhard 
2011). In addition to strengthening internal coherence of foreign policy in the EU, the EEAS 
can also be perceived as the prime institution for forging external coherence by supporting 
the delivery of ‘structurally harmonized’ outputs in policies – such as external economic, 
foreign, security, defence and development – and between actors, e.g. member-states’ 
embassies and EU delegations in third countries and to other international organisations 
(Gänzle et al. 2012; Gebhard 2011). In short, the EEAS is expected to accompany a more 
coherent EU foreign policy, thus reflecting a ‘joint-up’ and ‘whole-of-government’ approach 
to EU foreign policy. While the need for a unified EU foreign policy was first brought up 
during the ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ (December 2001–July 2003), its supporting 
structures – notably the EEAS – were negotiated between HR/VP Baroness Ashton, the 
Commission, the Council, the member-states and the European Parliament following the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (Murdoch 2012a). Staffing and personnel issues involved in 
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the EEAS were one of the most difficult key themes tackled during these negotiations. For 
instance, the design of the organigramme was strategically avoided for both political and 
legal reasons (Interview 8) and did not even feature in the agreement formalised by the 
Parliament’s Plenary on 8 July 2010 (e.g., Art. 4 and 5 of the Formal Agreement of July 2010; 
see also Murdoch 2012a). One of the reasons behind this absence lay in the overt ambitions 
regarding posts and positions in the EEAS displayed by all member-states already during the 
negotiations, which made the organigramme politically divisive (Murdoch 2012a). This, 
however, directly raises the question how these express desires on the side of the member-
states translate into their policies and strategies regarding the staffing of the EEAS, and to 
which extent it influences the possibility of independent recruitment within the EEAS.  
  
The next two sub-sections will illuminate how administrative capacities at EU level and pre-
existing organisational traditions and practices affect the recruitment of domestic 
government officials to the EEAS. This provides an opportunity to assess under what 
conditions the recruitment of personnel to the EEAS is relatively independent from member-
states’ influence, and thus conditions for political order transformation in foreign relations 
administration. 
 
Administrative capacities and pre-existing organisational formats for recruitment to the EEAS 
One of the first lessons often mentioned by our interviewees when discussing the 
organisational architecture of EEAS’ recruitment of member-state officials is how strongly it 
builds on pre-existing procedures and processes employed within the Commission and 
installed long before the EEAS arrived (Interviews 5, 6, 13, 14, 19, 21, 27, 28). This empirical 
lesson is most relevant as regards the first hiring round for member-state officials in January-
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March 2010, since it was effectively organised by opening the Commission’s internal rotation 
system – through which EU officials change post on a regular basis within its missions – “for 
the first time also to candidates from the two other sources (Council Secretariat General, 
member-states)” (Europa.eu 2010).3 Although this was no longer the case in the second 
hiring round starting in the summer of 2010, many of the Commission’s procedures for 
recruitment were retained at this point. For instance, the EEAS’ HR directorate continued to 
impose upon applicants the Commission style of composing and preparing the application 
dossiers (Interviews 10, 24) and pre-selected among the candidates according to the 
Commission’s point system (essentially translating the candidate’s cv into a numerical score 
depending on the requirements of the job opening) (Interviews 11, 13, 17, 19). Moreover, no 
positions were advertised in “the organisational chart related to HR” (Interview 19), such 
that the same “people who were managing for the Commission, its human resources for 
delegations abroad” remained in charge of EEAS’ recruitment (Interviews 11, 19). All in all, it 
was a system “fundamentally geared towards continuation as a Commission body” 
(Interview 11), thus suggesting that the organisation of the recruitment was profoundly 
shaped by pre-existing organisational forms within the Commission. 
 
“[I]t is the same people from the DG Relex that are doing the assessment … They are 
looking for the same criteria as they would have been for their own people …” 
(Interview 11). 
 
The administrative capacities of the Commission in the recruitment process of EEAS 
personnel correspondingly weaken small member-states with few administrative capacities:  
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“It is a very lean procedure, and I don’t think there are very detailed assessments 
being made … In the end it is up to the individuals to make a good application [to the 
EEAS]” (Interview 28).  
 
While such organisational “copy-paste” from already existing formats (Interviews 7, 15, 19) 
can be explained by the urgency with which these procedures were put together (Interviews 
19, 21; see also below), the EEAS appears to also have taken a number of strategic decisions 
in its recruitment procedures to retain a strong position relative to the member-states. First, 
while information about the application process and recruitment outcomes is critical for 
member-states to optimise their approach and strategy towards vacancy calls in the EEAS 
and be able to have an influence on EEAS’ recruitment process (see above), such information 
was generally deemed by member-states to be “not moving freely” (Interview 20, but noted 
by most respondents). For instance, prior to the first hiring round, member-states “were not 
at all aware of the selection procedures and methods the EEAS was going to adopt” 
(Interview 19) and felt that this “leaves our applicants unprepared for the interview, for the 
whole procedure” (Interview 29). Similarly, information about the reasons behind applicants’ 
failure to be (pre-)selected could often only be obtained by personally contacting the EEAS: 
“it was not systematic” (Interview 20, also Interview 26). Although such informational 
breakdowns might be expected given that the EEAS initially had to rely on relatively few 
people and operate in a completely new institutional structure, member-states often had 
the impression that “there was a resistance by the EEAS to share certain kinds of 
information” (Interview 21). Evidently, with the EEAS able to “control the flow of 
information” within and between institutions (Farrell and Héritier 2004: 1188), it was able to 
retain a powerful position vis-à-vis the member-states. Such behaviour is in line with 
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Chisholm’s (1989: 32) warning that the provision of information “is often potentially 
damaging to the party who is supposed to supply it”. 
 
“[T]here is a certain impression that the overanxious approach of the Commission still 
prevails, which is no wonder because actually most of the personnel is the 
Commission staff” (Interview 4).  
 
Suggestive of independence of recruitment, the EEAS acted as a very strict agenda-setter in 
both the timing of vacancy calls relative to their application deadlines (with often very short 
application windows; Interviews 9, 10, 13) and the provision of candidates’ information 
relative to the sequencing of interviews with information often reaching member-states’ 
representatives in the (pre)selection panels only a few days before the recruitment 
committee meeting (Interviews 4, 7, 11, 14, 19). Such tight control over the agenda, and the 
apparent strategic use thereof, by the EEAS obviously has a vast impact on member-states’ 
“capacities for action” (Crozier and Friedberg 1980: 42). Moreover, by limiting the number of 
vacancy calls “in the central office, where (…) policy decisions are made” (Interview 27) and 
excluding positions related to the HR directorate (Interview 19; see above), the EEAS not 
only illustrated its independence in deciding about the recruitment process, but 
simultaneously signalled its desire to remain independent also in its future decision-making 
behaviour (cf. Meier and Nigro 1976; Wise 2003). 
 
The individual applications should be submitted directly to the EEAS, not via the member-
states’ administrations. Even though member-states’ MFAs are required to provide a letter 
illustrating the candidate’s ‘diplomatic credentials’, which might open for the possibility of 
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pre-selecting potential candidates by Member States (Interviews 3, 24), this direct 
application system clearly implies that member-state governments would be bypassed: “If 
you apply an open approach, you cannot really control or steer” (Interview 4). “We don’t 
pre-cook anyting” (Interview 17). Consequently, it effectively curtails the potential influence 
of member-states on the proceedings. 
 
“[L]et everybody apply provided that they fulfil the criteria … and let then the EEAS to 
make the entire selection” (Interview 17). 
 
“It is also clear that people within the panel [of the EEAS], who are aware of this 
history, may tend to promote their own candidates” (Interview 18).  
 
“It is true that there is a great influence of the European Commission – now the EEAS 
– in the sense that those panels are chaired by a person coming from the EEAS … But 
the fact is that, for the pre-selection phase, chaired by the EEAS and the fact that the 
work of the pre-selection is developed on the basis of what has been prepared by the 
EEAS, that influences very much the work of the panel” (Interview 13). 
 
Finally, the EEAS decides upon the composition of the (pre-)selection panels, and thereby 
appears to consistently place representatives from member-state governments into, at best, 
a minority position. In fact, member-states are “not represented in the panels for heads of 
division, for instance (…) not in all the middle management and junior positions” (Interview 
19). When they are represented, they consistently face a numerical majority from the EU 
institutions. For example, in the Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA), which 
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appoints the Heads of Mission as well as posts starting at the Director level within the EEAS 
Headquarters, the member-states have two representatives out of six members (the 
remaining four members coming from EEAS (2), Council (1) and Commission (1)) – with 
decisions requiring a two thirds majority. Moreover, unlike for the representatives from the 
EU institutions in the CCA, for the representatives of member-states “it functions on the 
rotation basis, so (…) there’s not really a consistency and coherence on who is representing” 
(Interview 11; also Interview 4, 14). This is, however, already an improvement since no 
representation was awarded to member-states during the first hiring round (which initiated 
repeated interventions by several member-states including Austria, Denmark, France, and 
the United Kingdom; Assemblée Nationale, 29/09/2010), nor was such participation even 
considered when Baroness Ashton first set up the CCA (Interviews 3, 4, 10).4 Even so, 
requests for a more equal say were ignored by the EEAS: “probably the one single change 
which was not incorporated was precisely more participation” (Interview 4). As a direct 
consequence, so member-states complained,  
 
“we can help draw up the right shortlist for us member-states, but then the EEAS will 
decide [who gets the post], or to restart the process completely” (Interview 10; also 
interview 14).  
 
All this, however, need not imply that member-states did not attempt to influence the 
results of the recruitment process in their favour. In fact, they developed a number of 
different strategies with exactly this aim in mind. The most far-reaching of these consisted of 
“a work of diligent and smart lobbying activities” (Interview 5; also Interviews 14, 15, 19, 28) 
– although this mostly applies for postings at higher (political) levels (Interviews 5, 14). More 
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conventionally, many member-states attempted to professionalise the way they manage 
vacancy notices from the EEAS. Although voluntary preparatory workshops and information 
booklets for EEAS applicants were thereby widespread (confirmed by most interviewees), 
bigger member-states tended to thereby exploited well-established routines and 
programmes – “our career development concept, let’s say” (Interview 27; also Manley, 2012) 
– while ‘new’ and smaller member-states often relied on more ad hoc procedures 
(Interviews 6, 21, 22, 23, 29), which in many cases relied more directly on input from EEAS 
officials (Interviews 14, 24, 29). These patterns might provide an explanation for recent 
views suggesting that there is a gap between old and new member-states when it comes to 
the rate of success in terms of bringing national officials into the EEAS. Indeed, albeit to 
varying degrees, new member-states are under-represented in the new Service: “Out of 134 
people who applied for 10 senior management posts in Brussels, there were 34 'new' 
diplomats, 74 'old' ones and 26 EU officials. None of the 'new' ones got through” (Rettman 
2012). Building on our interview data, the lack of well-established organisational capacities 
in new member-states to receive training appears to be an important factor in explaining 
such differences, which illustrates the effect of administrative capacity for recruitment in 
member-state governments.  
 
Regarding the actual recruitment practice in the EEAS, it is illustrative to regard the relative 
importance attached by the EEAS and member-states to certain qualities of candidates, and 
how this translates into EEAS’ recruitment decisions. We thereby concentrate on three 
elements: The relative emphasis put on merit versus nationality, technical expertise versus 
diplomatic qualifications, and the importance of work experience in the Brussels institutions 
for candidates to EEAS posts. 
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First, while the EEAS favours merit over nationality, many member-states have argued that 
“this one third quota needs to be fulfilled proportionally by all member-states” (Interview 
29), implying a need to have some degree of geographical balance (Interviews 4, 5, 12, 18, 
24, 21, 28). That is,  
 
“from a [country] point of view, it’s about trying to find a good [country national], but 
from the institutional point of view, it’s trying to find the best person to do the job” 
(Interview 7; also Interview 19).  
 
The issue of nationality appears, however, to be treated by the EEAS as a matter of relatively 
minor concern. Several respondents indeed indicated that “how the panels have been 
working, it has been merit proof” (Interview 7), while geographical balance “does not seem 
to us to be happening right now” (Interview 12). Hence, even though geographical balance 
may signal some degree of national ‘ownership’ of international institutions (see above), 
there is little evidence of member-states’ ability to impose positive weight on candidate’s 
nationality in the recruitment process. 
 
Second, technical expertise has been a key concern in Commission’s hiring in external 
relations, while diplomatic qualifications form a core requirement for member-states. These 
credentials, most often acquired at diplomatic academies and always following a highly 
competitive selection process, are often perceived as the cornerstone of the diplomatic 
esprit de corps (Hocking and Spence 2006). Following Commission’s posting practices, EEAS 
has put substantial weight on candidates’ technical and management expertise (Interviews 4, 
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11, 14, 16, 17, 27) despite its formal requirement that member-state candidates should have 
relevant ‘diplomatic credentials’. As a response, several member-states allowed for a fairly 
broad and encompassing interpretation of ‘diplomatic credentials’ when deciding on 
granting the candidate a ‘letter of support’ (Interviews 3, 4, 11, 19, 22, 24). Such leniency in 
interpretation was thereby seen as a key means to satisfy a desire to “maximise our success 
possibility” (Interview 19). Evidently, a lenient translation allows sending in more applicants, 
which increases the chance of having at least some successful candidates (Interview 14, 19). 
However, it might also increase member-states influence on EEAS’ recruitment process if 
EEAS conforms to this broader interpretation. Exactly such readjustment of the EEAS’ 
application requirement occurred after the first rotation (see also Murdoch 2012b). 
Although this initially suggests that member-states had at least some influence on the 
decision-process of the EEAS, the EEAS did not communicate exact nature of the changes in 
its application requirements at the time of the change (Interview 3, 6, 20), thus generating “a 
lot of questions all over Europe” (Interview 20; also Interview 3, 28). Clearly, such ambiguity 
benefits the EEAS’ ability to retain independence of its recruitment practice, as it keeps 
member-states continuously lagging one step behind: “we had to improvise because the 
service improvises as well a lot” (Interview 6). 
 
Finally, EEAS appears to also have stood its ground (against member-state demands) when it 
concerns the importance attached to work experience in the Brussels institutions. While 
such experience is of lesser importance to member-states – given that countries’ diplomatic 
traditions often vary substantially from the Commission’s view of external relations – “if you 
look at what is making the grade in the EEAS, it is clear that having served in Brussels gives 
you an edge” (Interview 28). 
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Overall, therefore, EEAS appears to have kept a firm hold over both the formal 
organisational architecture of the selection process, and the practical implementation 
thereof. As a consequence, it has been able to ensure, thus far, that its recruitment 
procedures and practices remain largely independent of member-states’ influence. This 
indicates that the EEAS might well be seen as another reflection of an independent 
European political order in the making. Moreover, given that the EU historically lacked 
substantive capacity within this policy field (Duke et al. 2012), the EEAS may serve as a hard 
case for such order transformation. 
 
Concluding discussion 
The EEAS reflects a transformation of Europe’s political order in which EU institutions 
acquire relative independence from member-state governments. This paper provides 
evidence supportive of such order transformation by  illustrating the substantial 
independence of the recruitment of domestic government officials to the EEAS. We also 
argue that EEAS represents a hard case of order transformation due to both the inherent 
intergovernmental stronghold of this policy area and the historical lack of EU capacity 
building within this policy field (Duke et al. 2012).  
 
Theoretically, this paper shows that the recruitment of EEAS personnel reflect both (i) the 
supply of administrative capacities at EU level, and (ii) pre-existing organisational traditions, 
practices and formats. With regard to (i) the supply of EU administrative capacities, the 
paper shows that the supply of independent administrative capacities inside the Commission 
and the EEAS in practice tends to safeguard independence of recruitment of EEAS staff from 
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member-state governments, and thus one condition for political order transformation in the 
domain of EU’s foreign relations administration. The data suggests that the EEAS treat 
member-states as “external counterparts”, whereas member-states feel they “should be 
considered as full stakeholders” (Interview 19). Secondly, the data reported also shows that 
that the recruitment practice of EEAS personnel is considerably fashioned by pre-existing 
organisational traditions, practices and formats. Organisational theory ascribes an 
autonomous role for pre-existing organisational structures to account for the emergence 
and institutionalisation of new organisational structures, and their effects. Particularly, 
during periods of rapid institutional formation – as faced by Europe at the time of the 
establishment of the EEAS – new institutional arrangements may be profoundly shaped by 
pre-existing organisational forms. Moreover, lack of time when creating new institutions 
makes decision-makers’ ‘pursuit of intelligence’ bounded and their search for solutions local 
(March 2010: 19). The likelihood of institutional reproduction may be particularly high in cases 
with few institutional ‘models’. The paper shows empirically that member-states with strong 
pre-existing organisational capacities and traditions for recruitment of diplomats seem to co-
ordinate the recruitment of EEAS officials more strongly than member-states with few 
domestic capacities and traditions for diplomatic recruitment. Similarly, the Commission’s 
tradition of calling upon policy experts rather than diplomats is reflected in the recruitment of 
domestic diplomatic personnel to the EEAS as well.  
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Notes 
 
                                                        
*  Deleted for review  
1 ‘AD’ refers to individuals at the level of administrators/advisors and higher. Note also that 
the individuals concerned remain member-state officials since their positions are set up as 
temporary four-year posts (extendable with another four years and, in exceptional cases, 
two more years after that), upon completion of which the official’s home institution is 
required to re-integrate him/her among its staff. 
2  A very large majority of the appointments from the first rotation had been awarded when 
our interviews started, while the application and appointment process of the second 
rotation was ongoing throughout the entire interview period. 
3  Although the Commission had no foreign policy competencies and as such had no 
embassies, it maintained ‘representations’ in 136 countries. After the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which conferred a legal identity on the EU, these were transformed into EU 
‘delegations’ (i.e., embassies). 
4 Both the characteristics of the initially proposed CCA (i.e., no member-state involvement), 
and the way it was brought forward (i.e., no input requested from member-states in its 
development), signalled that the EEAS saw the CCA as “their prerogative (…) [which] 
member-states should not mingle in” (Interview 3; also Interview 19). Interestingly, a 
similar approach was taken by Baroness Ashton with the introduction of new rules for the 
secondment of member-state officials into EEAS: “The change in secondment rules has 
been passed by Ms Ashton and her Headquarters, but not announced or anything” 
(Interview 3). 
